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Determining the Best of All Possible Worlds
Up until about a decade ago, optimism, or the view that this is the best of all possible 
worlds, was the subject of a great deal of discussion in the philosophical literature. 
This has now largely ceased, apparently because a consensus view has been reached 
that the very concept of the best of all possible worlds can be shown to be incoherent 
by deploying the following simple argument: for any world that might be termed the 
best, there is always another which is better, therefore the concept of the best of all  
possible worlds is meaningless.1 To put the conclusion another way, the description 
“is the best of all possible worlds” can have no referent from among the full range of 
possible worlds.
     The perceived strength of this argument, which is sometimes referred to as the No 
Best World argument, is such that even its adherents rarely use more than a sentence 
or two to introduce,  develop,  and deploy it.  This is  odd because the argument  as 
presented above is in need of fleshing out, since as it stands it seems incomplete. Why 
is it that for any given world there is always another that is better? While many of the 
defenders of the argument do not explicitly say, some of them provide useful glimpses 
of the sort of answer they have in mind:
Presumably the goodness of...a world...will  consist  in  part  in it  containing  a 
finite  or  infinite  number  of  conscious  beings  who  will  enjoy  it.  But  if  the 
enjoyment of the world by each is a valuable thing, surely a world with a few 
more conscious beings in it would be a yet more valuable world.2
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Just as there is no greatest  prime number,  so perhaps there is no best of all 
possible worlds. Perhaps for any world you mention, replete with dancing girls 
and  deliriously  happy  sentient  creatures,  there  is  an  even  better  world, 
containing even more dancing girls and deliriously happy sentient creatures.3
Thus the reason why for any given world there is always another that is better is that 
if we examine the kind of goodness applicable to worlds, we find that it  does not 
admit of a maximum degree.
     It is evident that such an examination will have to be done a priori, and not just in 
the case of worldly goodness either. We do not determine that there is no greatest 
integer by getting a man or machine to write down all possible integers and asking 
them to let us know if they do or do not find one which could reasonably be described 
as the greatest. We simply ask if any contradiction would manifest itself if we kept 
adding to any given integer.  In the case of integers  it  seems there is  no manifest 
absurdity in the idea that for any positive integer there will always be another that is 
greater,  and consequently there is  a manifest  absurdity in the notion of a greatest 
integer.  Is  a  similar  absurdity  present  in  the  notion  of  an  upper  limit  to  worldly 
goodness?
     The consensus view seems to be that there is. Robert Elliot has argued that “it is  
plausible that...the range of values for possible worlds has no upper limit,” though it 
would  be  difficult  to  endorse  or  criticise  such  a  sweeping  view  without  first 
ascertaining what the value or goodness of a world consists in.4 On this point there are 
two  prevailing  opinions.  Some  philosophers  identify  the  quantity  of  happiness  or 
enjoyment as the measure of the value or goodness of a world, while others suggest 
virtue.5 Do either of these admit of a maximum degree?
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1. Happiness and Virtue
It has been suggested that happiness is not a maximizable good, and so no matter how 
much happiness a world contains, it could always contain more.6 The two arguments 
commonly invoked to support this conclusion are that there is no logical maximum to 
how happy human beings or other creatures can be and that there is no logical limit to 
the number of happy beings that can exist in a world. A possible rejoinder to the first 
of these arguments is to say that, with us, it is the type of beings we are that limit our 
capacity for happiness.7 By extension, it seems reasonable to argue that other types of 
creature likewise have limits imposed on them by the kinds of beings they are. While 
the notion of species-set limits on happiness seems right, a weakness in this rejoinder 
is that it fails to eliminate the possibility of a limit to how far the species-set limits can 
go, and that there is an ultimate limit on happiness that cannot be exceeded by any 
possible type of creature, even if there are an infinity of them. However we do not 
need  to  go  further  into  the  question  of  whether  there  is  a  maximal  degree  of 
happiness,  and  possible  creatures  capable  of  attaining  it,  as  the  second  argument 
mentioned above in support of the conclusion that there can be no maximally happy 
worlds seems to be unanswerable. It surely remains so whether we accept the idea of 
maximally happy creatures or not.
     What, then, are we to say of the case for maximizing the virtue in a world? Again,  
it seems possible to argue that there is a limit to how virtuous any individual creature 
can be, this being defined by its life span. There are only so many virtuous deeds a 
creature can pack in to a finite lifetime, even if it was to spend all its available time 
performing virtuous deeds.8 But even if there is a limit to how virtuous any given 
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individual can be, this does not mean that there is a corresponding limit to how much 
virtue a world can contain. As we saw in the preceding discussion on happiness, there 
are no limits on space. More maximally virtuous creatures could always be added to a 
world, thus boosting the sum total of virtue in that world ever upward.
2. Three More Worldly Goods
At this stage most philosophers suggest enough has been done to show the notion of 
the best possible world to be incoherent. But our failure to pick out a maximizable 
good can be explained just as well by the fact that we have so far been considering the 
wrong types of things as worldly goods. Certainly in the vast literature on the problem 
of evil we find an entirely different good mentioned time and again, namely creaturely 
free will.  Indeed, the existence of free creatures is often considered to be such an 
overriding good that it outweighs all the evil that such creatures bring about by their 
frequent  misdeeds.9 Could  the  number  of  free  creatures  be  the  measure  of  the 
goodness of a world? Although this would appear to be consistent with a lot of the 
thinking on the problem of evil over the last forty years, the snag is that, again, as 
there are no limits on space there is no obvious limit to the number of free creatures  
the universe could contain. If the goodness of possible worlds is measured by how 
many free creatures they contain, then there can be no best world.
     It might be supposed that our aim of salvaging a coherent notion of the best of all 
possible worlds is now hopeless, as we have exhausted the most plausible candidates 
for worldly goods. It might further be supposed that, even if we can identify another 
candidate, we now have good inductive grounds for supposing that it is going to be as 
resistant  to  maximization  as  all  the  others.  Both  suppositions  are  wrong.  An 
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acquaintance with the historical literature on the problem of evil furnishes us with two 
further  candidates  for  worldly  goods,  simplicity  of  natural  laws  and  variety  of 
phenomena.10 More promising still, both of these are seemingly maximizable. Let us 
take nomic simplicity first; how are we to understand the idea of the simple possible 
laws? The conception favored by both Malebranche and Leibniz is not, as might be 
supposed, that of the algebraically simplest laws, but of laws which are universal and 
uniform in nature.  Considered  this  way,  the idea  of  the  simplest  possible  laws is 
perfectly coherent,  as there is no contradiction in the idea of laws applying to all 
things  in  all  places  and  times.  In  what  follows,  simplest  laws  will  therefore  be 
construed to be laws that are universal and uniform. Turning to variety, there again 
seems to be no contradiction in the notion of a world containing every compossible 
type of thing or, if we wish to take the Spinozistic route, every compossible thing. As 
long as there are no limits on space, which presumably there are not, maximal variety 
is achievable.
     We have, at last, hit upon not one but two maximizable goods. It is worthwhile 
noting that variety and simplicity are not just relics of the golden age of theodicy; in 
fact simple laws have been worked into at least once recent theodicy.11 Moreover, 
theistic  philosophers  often  consider  them to be  important  in  that  the  operation  of 
universal and uniform laws enables free creatures to have a high degree of confidence 
about the outcomes of their  actions,  which is vital  if free creatures are to be held 
responsible for what they do.12 Meanwhile the diversity of things has been credited 
with extending the range of choices available to free creatures and thus making free 
will  more  significant.13 Therefore  simplicity  and  variety  remain  very  plausible 
candidates  for worldly goods even today.  The drawback is that few contemporary 
philosophers would be prepared to accept that the goodness of a world is determined 
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solely by how simple its laws are or by how much variety it contains. But why should 
we suppose that the goodness of a world is merely determined by its measure of one 
single  good?  Might  not  several  goods  combine  to  determine  the  measure  of  the 
goodness of a world? There is some appeal in this idea, as an insistence on monism 
requires the ruling out of four of the five candidates for worldly goods that we have 
identified, namely happiness, virtue, free creatures, nomic simplicity, and variety of 
phenomena, and this hardly seems defensible given that each candidate appears to 
bring some value to a world. What this suggests is that the goodness of a world might 
not be determined by a single type of good, as proponents of the No Best World 
argument  typically  suppose,  but  by a combination of two or more  types  of good. 
Prima facie such a suggestion would seem to fall  victim to the same problem as 
before, namely that maximization is no more possible with two goods than it is with 
one. Of course maximization is possible if we take the goodness of a world to be 
determined wholly by variety and nomic simplicity, as both can be maximized. But 
with  any  other  combination  of  the  five  possible  goods  we  have  identified, 
maximization will not be possible and, consequently, it will be impossible for there to 
be  a  best  among  an  infinity  of  possible  worlds.  If  the  goodness  of  a  world  is 
determined by at least two goods, and at least one of these goods is inherently non-
maximizable, then it would always be possible to include more of that good in a world 
irrespective of whether the other goods can be maximized.
     However a significant assumption made here is that, if there is more than one 
particular type of good that determines the goodness of a world, then the goods will 
be mutually compatible.  This is not a reasonable assumption to make,  since some 
goods could be in tension or conflict with one another, such that the more there is of  
one type of good the less there can be of another. Where there is such tension, and 
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goods are in opposition, so to speak, we find that instead of looking for a world which 
contains the maximum of one or more type of good, we are searching for one that 
possesses the optimal trade-off between at least two types of conflicting good. We 
should be clear that this represents a fundamental shift in our focus, as the notion of 
maximization  is  altogether  different  from  that  of  optimization,  and  it  would  be 
worthwhile taking the time to clarify the distinction.
3. Optimization and Maximization
Maximization is the process whereby the greatest  possible degree of a variable  or 
parameter is realised. Optimization also involves the realisation of a maximum, but in 
circumstances where there are two or more variables or parameters, and there is an 
inbuilt tension or conflict between these objectives. In such cases, the best result is not 
typically obtained by maximizing one of the variables or parameters, but by seeking a 
compromise  between  them.  Optimization  is  thus  a  maximization  of  the  functions 
between variables  or parameters.  This  abstract  characterization  needs fleshing out. 
Fortunately for our purposes, optimization is not just a concept familiar in the rarefied 
world of mathematics, it is also common in economics, biology and engineering, as 
well  as  other  disciplines  drawing on mathematical  reasoning,  and these  afford  us 
many examples of optimization at work. For instance, economists  have discovered 
that there is a tension between the government objectives of low inflation and low 
unemployment, and they represent this graphically by the Philips curve, which plots 
an inverse relationship between the rates of inflation and unemployment. A similar 
relationship is observed by biologists between litter size and size of offspring, namely 
the greater the one, the less of the other. In aircraft design several design parameters 
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compete, such as weight of the craft, fuel efficiency and payload. Increasing one of 
these  design  parameters  invariably  leads  to  a  decrease  in  the  others,  making  it 
necessary to trade them off against each other.  What this example brings out is the 
element  of  constraint  that  conflicting  variables  impose  on  a  designer.  In  aircraft 
design these are causal conflicts and therefore causal constraints, as their existence 
depends to a large extent on our current level of technical know-how and what is 
possible given the laws of nature that we have. Causal conflicts such as these, and the 
constraints that arise from them, would obviously not frustrate an omnipotent God. 
But the sort of conflicts  we are supposing to hold between worldly goods are not 
causal in nature, but logical, and they therefore bring with them logical constraints on 
what even God can achieve when creating a world. Any appeal that omnipotence is 
not bound by the constraints imposed by conflicting goods is therefore just wasted 
breath, as omnipotence is typically taken to have to work within the boundaries of 
logic rather than outside them.
     Let us now go a little further into the idea of a conflict obtaining between two or  
more worldly goods. Suppose a simplified scenario of two goods that are inversely 
related,  such that  the more  there is  of one good the less there can be of another. 
Would it be better to have a lot of the first good and a little of the other, or a little of 
the  first  good and a  lot  of  the  other? In cases  such as  this  there  is  a  recognised 
mathematical procedure for ascertaining the optimal result, known as the calculus of 
variations. This utilises differential equations to determine the optimal condition for a 
relationship between two or more variables such as our conflicting goods. What holds 
us back from wheeling in the mathematicians is the need to give accurate and detailed 
information  about  the  goods  being  traded  off.  For  instance,  we  know  that  our 
conflicting  goods  will  have  an  inverse  relationship,  but  is  this  a  straightforward 
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inverse relationship or a more complicated one? Do we assume that both goods are 
equally weighted, or that one is of greater value than the other? Hence not only do we 
need to  know what  the  goods in  question  are,  but  also the nature  of  the relation 
between them and their respective value as determined by the objective standards for 
world making. Without the required information our tool for determining the optimal 
trade-off cannot be brought into play, which means that the optimal balance of goods 
must remain a mystery. But for our purposes it is not necessary to actually determine 
the optimal trade-off of conflicting goods, only to recognise that theoretically it can be 
done and that there is a determinate point in the relationship between opposing goods 
that marks a trade-off that cannot be bettered. Other trade-offs return inferior results, 
and hence inferior worlds, thanks to the law of marginal returns. In the possible world 
exemplifying  the  optimal  trade-off  between  two  or  more  conflicting  goods,  we 
therefore have a genuine best of all possible worlds.
4. Incommensurability and Incomparability
Before identifying which goods are in conflict,  we need to ensure that optimizing 
them will even be possible. Indeed some readers are likely to argue that it will not be 
possible, on the grounds that, as we are positing conflicting goods, these goods will in 
all likelihood be incommensurable.14 To put this another way, the values of the goods 
in conflict  seemingly cannot be converted to a common measure and ranked on a 
single scale. This in turn is said to entail that many worlds will be incomparable with 
each other, because there will be no way to rationally determine whether, in terms of 
value, one will be better, worse or much the same as another. For instance, if one 
world has one hundred units of a particular good and five of a different good, and 
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another world has five units of the first good and one hundred units of the other, how 
can  they  be  appropriately  compared?  Unless  the  values  of  the  two goods  can  be 
converted to a common measure it seems that they cannot be compared, and if that is 
right  then it  will  be impossible,  even in principle,  to  determine which of the two 
possible worlds is best. Since many other possible worlds will be no less comparable 
with each other,  our hope of finding a coherent  notion of the best of all  possible 
worlds will lie in ruins. The objection from incommensurability could thus hardly be 
more serious
     By way of response we might appeal to the old chestnut of epistemic constraints, 
namely  that  problems  of  incommensurability  and  incomparability  might  only  be 
problems in the human sphere, and that God, being omniscient, can see in an instant 
the means of resolving them even if these means happen to elude us. There is a lot of 
mileage in this response. When the incommensurabilist  points out the difficulty in 
ranking different degrees of different goods he is assuming that appearance and reality 
match  up,  so  that  goods  that  seem  to  us  to  be  incommensurable  really  are 
incommensurable. But we would be justified in asking the incommensurabilist for a 
reason to rule out categorically even the barest possibility that one good might be 
commensurate with another good, and also justified in insisting that this reason not 
hinge merely on how things might appear. This demand should not be mistaken for a 
weak attempt to evade the issue either, as matters pertaining to world creation are 
very dimly understood by human reason, if they are even understood at all,  so we 
must be wary of projecting problems from the human sphere onto larger theatres. In 
any  case,  even  if  the  incommensurabilist  can  provide  us  with  proof  of  the 
incommensurability of goods, incommensurables are not always incomparable.  For 
example,  the first  recorded case of incommensurability was that uncovered by the 
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Pythagoreans, who could discern no common unit that would express the side of a 
square  and  its  diagonal.  Despite  this  incommensurability,  the  two  lengths  are 
comparable  and  can  be  mathematically  proved  so.  Other  examples  of 
incommensurability can be dealt with using  what Ruth Chang has called “nominal-
notable comparisons,” which are worth illustrating.15
     Consider the two worlds we discussed earlier. In terms of goodness the first world 
has one hundred units of a particular good and five units of another good, while the 
second world has five units of the first good and one hundred units of the other. Let us 
now consider a further world, which has five units of the first good and five of the 
other.  In Chang’s terminology,  the first  two worlds described are deemed notable 
bearers of value because they each possess a very high overall level of value, whereas 
the third world is deemed a nominal bearer of value as it possesses a very low overall  
level  of  value.  Although  the  introduction  of  the  third  world  may  not  shake  our 
conviction that the first two worlds are incomparable, we can nevertheless see that the 
third world is comparable to both of the others. Moreover, a comparison will show 
that the third world is not just inferior to the first and second worlds in terms of value, 
but considerably inferior. At this point let us consider a fourth world that is better than 
the third world but only by virtue of its possessing the smallest possible extra amount 
of the second of the two goods. This fourth world is obviously comparable to the 
second world, but is it also comparable to the first world? It seems very plausible to 
suppose that it is, as the fourth world is scarcely a better nominal bearer of value than 
the third world, and the third world as we know is certainly comparable to the first  
world. If we accept that comparability holds between the first and fourth worlds, as 
seems reasonable, then we would also have to accept that it holds between the first 
world and a fifth world, which is better than the fourth but again only by virtue of its 
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containing the smallest possible extra amount of the second of the two goods. In other 
words,  we  are  forced  to  concede  the  values  of  different  kinds  of  goods  are  not 
inherently incomparable at all.16 This does not necessarily mean that we can easily 
decide which of the first and second worlds is better, and it is possible that we could 
never work it out. But then again we do not have to; the only being who needs to 
know how to rationally discriminate between possible worlds is he who is looking to 
create one. For our purposes it matters only that worlds possessing different values of 
conflicting goods can be compared, as this alone is enough to guarantee a coherent 
notion of the best of all possible worlds.
5. The Conflict of Worldly Goods
Let us consider whether  any of the five goods identified  earlier  are  in conflict  as 
described above. For our purposes it does not matter which of our five candidates for 
worldly goods are actually worldly goods. In order to develop a coherent notion of the 
best  of  all  possible  worlds  it  will  be  sufficient  to  show that  tensions  are  present 
between some of the most plausible candidates for worldly goods, and therefore if any 
of these candidates turn out to be genuine worldly goods then they will need to be 
optimized.
     We can discern three pairs of goods that are in tension, namely simplicity and 
happiness, variety and happiness, and virtue and happiness. First, there is a conflict 
between nomic simplicity and human happiness, since if the laws of the world were 
more flexible and therefore not so uniform and universal, then much of what typically 
makes men unhappy need never occur. But a simple and regular network of laws is 
not conducive to widespread happiness, principally because of its rigidity.17
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     A second conflict is found between happiness and the variety of phenomena in a 
world. Plotinus, who believed that our world does feature maximal variety, noted that 
in a world of diversity things simply get in the way of each other, leading to a “war 
without rest, without truce” among things.18 People are involved in the war no less 
than any other creature; consider how much human unhappiness has been caused by 
the range of bacteria, viruses, parasites and other organisms, large and small. It is the 
nature, the very being of certain creatures to cause harm to others, because part of 
what it is to be those creatures is to act in ways which bring about harm to others, and 
they cannot be what they are without bringing about that harm. Some aspects of a 
varied world are thus of necessity directly opposed to human happiness. It could be 
argued that,  with a little careful planning, this need not actually cause any human 
unhappiness, for instance if every type of creature was allocated its own planet away 
from humans. This arrangement, it might be said, would guarantee maximal diversity 
of things and yet also ensure that no type of creature would ever cause suffering to 
mankind.  But there are two problems with this  suggestion.  First,  if  the variety of 
things is, as we suggested earlier,  a good on account of it  increasing the range of 
choices  available  to  free  creatures,  it  follows  that  free  creatures  and other  things 
should not be kept apart. Second, if creatures were kept apart in the way described 
above, the arrangement would lead to either mass cannibalism or mass starvation on 
almost every planet. Suffering and unhappiness would therefore still be widespread 
among other creatures even if not among our own species.
     The final conflicting pair of goods is virtue and happiness. We do not need to hold 
a form of Kantian ethics to recognise a tension between these two, because in the 
normal usage of the term, and certainly in the theistic context which is assumed in this 
paper, virtue is taken to involve, at least in part, the overcoming of an inclination or 
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temptation  to  act  solely  for  personal  benefit.  To  put  it  another  way,  virtue  often 
involves selflessness and sacrifice, as is clear from examples such as charity, chastity, 
and courage. In order to be charitable, chaste, or courageous, a person has to put their 
own desires to one side and pursue a course that is often not the most pleasant of 
those  on  offer.  Moreover,  some  virtues  logically  require  evils:  courage  requires 
hardship, for instance, and generosity requires need, and as hardship and need are 
clear sources of unhappiness, it is but a short step to the realisation that in order for 
anyone to be courageous and generous there must be others who are experiencing 
unhappiness. Virtue can thus be said to be in tension with happiness for two reasons: 
the practice of virtue requires sacrifices to be made, which impacts on the happiness 
of the person who makes them, and in order for some virtues to be practiced at all  
there must also be others already experiencing suffering and unhappiness.
     Although it is possible that there might be other tensions between the five possible 
goods identified earlier, we shall henceforth assume that the only conflicts between 
them are those outlined above. As it stands then, out of our five possible goods, all of 
the various conflicts  between them involve happiness. If we were to assume for a 
moment that happiness is a worldly good, we can see that there are fifteen possible 
combinations it can make with the other four goods. For example, happiness can be 
combined  with  virtue,  with  simplicity,  with  free  creatures  and  with  diversity; 
happiness can also be combined with pairings of other goods, such as with virtue and 
simplicity, with virtue and free creatures, with virtue and variety, with simplicity and 
free  creatures,  with  variety  and  free  creatures,  or  with  variety  and  simplicity; 
happiness can also be combined with any three of the other four possible goods, such 
as with virtue, simplicity, and free creatures, with virtue, simplicity, and variety, with 
virtue,  free creatures,  and variety,  or with simplicity,  free creatures,  and diversity; 
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lastly,  happiness  can be combined with all  four of the other  possible  goods.  It  is 
notable that out of these various combinations there is only one permutation, namely 
happiness  and free  creatures,  that  cannot  be  optimized,  since  there  is  no  conflict 
between  them.  All  the  other  combinations  are  optimizable  combinations  because 
happiness  conflicts  with virtue,  simplicity  and variety.  What  this  means  is  that  if 
happiness is a genuine worldly good, which is plausible to suppose, and one or more 
of virtue, variety and nomic simplicity is also a worldly good, as again is plausible to 
suppose, then because of the various tensions that exist between these goods, trade-
offs will be necessary to obtain the optimal balance between them, the balance that 
cannot be bettered by the further addition or subtraction of any of the goods. Only if 
we were to say that happiness and the number of free creatures wholly determine the 
goodness of a world would we be excused from admitting that there can be a best of 
all possible worlds. If we accept that the goodness of a world is determined by any 
other combination of goods then we are not so excused, and must allow that there is a 
best of all possible worlds, even if we wish to deny that this is it.
     The  question  that  emerges  from this  is,  which  of  the  fourteen  optimizable 
combination  of  goods  is  most  likely  to  be  the  combination  that  determines  the 
goodness of worlds? No attempt shall be made to answer that question here, nor the 
further question of where the optimal balance between conflicting goods might lie.19
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